Geoff Hoon: I thank my hon. Friend for her observations and I shall certainly ensure that they are passed on to those responsible. In turn, I would like to thank her, two other MPs and two MEPs who were in Britain's area of responsibility on election day. As reported to me by the commanding officer of Britain's armed forces, there was a tremendous response from the people of southern Iraq—predominantly Shia, but also Sunni—who turned out to vote in an atmosphere that was positive and encouraging for the future of the whole of Iraq. If I may add to my hon. Friend's observations, a significant degree of courage was displayed in some parts of Iraq—Falluja, for example—when people turned out to vote, despite the intimidation of the recent past. The response of the Iraqi people, it seems to me, provides real encouragement for the future of the country.

Brian Jenkins: My hon. Friend finds it easy to bat these silly questions away, but the changes in technology have meant that we have to change and reshape our forces. What is he doing to meet the shortfall in engineering and logistics, especially as such skills are very saleable in a buoyant economy? If he cannot answer that now, will he place his answer in the Library, showing the exact makeup of the Army, the shortfall and the pressures faced?

Bob Spink: I am grateful for that detailed response. We can be proud of our troops serving in Iraq. They have served with professionalism and courage. Now that the elections are successfully secured, will the Secretary of State make it his priority to secure the earliest possible return of those troops to this country, consistent with our international obligations and with security developing in Iraq?

Charles Clarke: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
	The strategy that I am setting out today comprises a major programme of measures to build confidence. We will continue to welcome genuine economic migration within strict criteria. The current system works well but is complex and difficult to understand. Therefore, we will bring all our current schemes for work and student migrants into one simple points-based system. That will ensure that we only take migrants for jobs that cannot be filled from our own work force and that we focus on the skilled workers that we need most. We believe that the labour available from European Union member states—old and new—should over time meet our national needs for low-skilled work. Therefore, in consultation with the industries and over time, we intend to phase out the current low-skilled quota schemes. We will of course review with the sectors how to fill any gaps that still remain, but any new schemes will be, as now, quota-based, temporary and tightly managed to ensure that people return home at the end of their stay. They will only be open to nationals of countries who agree to take back their citizens when they are no longer entitled to remain in the UK.
	That points system will be supported by new measures to ensure that it is not abused. Workers and students will be required to have sponsors such as employers or educational institutions who will share the responsibility of ensuring that they leave at the end of their time in the UK. The cost of running the visa system will be recovered from those who benefit—I am answering a written statement on that today. Where there has been clear evidence of abuse, we are ready to introduce financial bonds to guarantee that migrants return home when they should.
	We will set up an independent skills advisory body to advise us on labour market needs and skills shortages. The Government believe that a modern market-based economy such as ours requires a system that is flexible and employer-led, rather than some kind of centrally determined, rigid and arbitrary quota.
	We will continue to welcome genuine refugees. Like all other developed countries and the rest of the 145 nations that are now signatories, we will honour our obligations under the 1951 Geneva convention. It is part of the international legal and ethical framework that enshrines basic principles of human decency. The Government reject the idea of a fixed and arbitrary quota of refugees and withdrawal from the convention as unworkable, unjust, counter-productive and immoral. Withdrawal would deny to us the international co-operation that we need to deal with the real problems that cause asylum such as resolving conflict, combating immigration crime and returning failed asylum seekers to their own countries.
	We will continue to root out abuse by implementing rigorously the measures that we have taken to identify genuine refugees, by further strengthening our borders and by removing those whose claims fail. We will rationalise the appeals system to improve access to justice. From April, we will implement the new streamlined single tier of appeal. We will abolish the right of appeal against refusal of leave to enter the UK for work or study, and we will tighten up the operation of family visit appeals. We will continue to allow permanent settlement in this country where there is clear economic benefit and where migrants wish to integrate socially. We will tighten our conditions of settlement to reflect that by requiring those who want to settle to pass tests on English language and knowledge of the UK, by restricting settlement for economic migrants to skilled workers only, and by extending the period for which they need to have been here to five years before they get settlement.
	We will in future grant genuine refugees temporary status once their asylum claim has been granted, as happens in many comparable European countries. We will encourage them to work and participate in local communities, we will keep the situation in their home country under review and, if there has been significant improvement, we will expect them to return. If there has been no improvement after five years, they will be permitted to settle in the UK.
	Over the next five years, we will transform our immigration control. Using new technology, we will develop an integrated system dealing with people before they enter the UK, at our borders and while they are in the country. We will fingerprint everyone when they apply for a visa. Those fingerprints and other personal travel information will be checked against our own watch lists of those who present an immigration or security threat. Airlines will not have the authority to carry people until that check has been made.
	Identity cards will provide a simple and secure way of verifying identity, helping us to tackle illegal working, organised crime, terrorist activity, identity theft and fraudulent access to public services. The new borders technology will record people's departure from the country, which will help us to target our immigration checks, and we will back that up with fines for employers who take on illegal labour.
	We will continue to crack down hard on organised immigration crime, which targets the most vulnerable, the poorest and the young. We have introduced tough new penalties, gone after criminal assets and established the multi-agency Reflex task force to co-ordinate law enforcement and intelligence activity. That will be a major priority for the new Serious Organised Crime Agency.
	Swift removal of those not entitled to be in this country is central to the credibility of the whole system. Although we have removed many more failed asylum seekers and other immigration offenders than ever before, we intend substantially to increase the number in future. We will introduce a new and faster process for asylum applications, detain more people and use other means of contact like tagging to prevent people absconding when they are ready to be removed.
	We will take new measures to prevent people from concealing their identity by destroying their documents and thus making it much harder to get their own countries to take them back. We have already made it a criminal offence to arrive in the UK undocumented without good reason, and we are asking airlines to copy travel documents on certain routes.
	It will be most important to secure more effective returns arrangements with the countries from which most of our failed asylum seekers come. We will place migration at the centre of our relationship with those countries. We will give support to help with the reintegration of failed asylum seekers, if they need it, but we will also make it clear to the relevant countries that failure to agree such a joint approach will have implications for our wider relationship, including access to some migration schemes.
	Migration is a consequence of the increasingly global world economy, and asylum is an international issue. We will best address and make progress on those issues through effective international co-operation, not through some kind of fortress Britain splendid isolation. The fact is that partnerships with other countries, the European Union and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are essential to delivering our objectives.
	Taken together, this is a major programme to build on the foundations that we have laid by creating a system which will be, and which will be seen to be, transparent and fair to all. It is a practical and systematic response to the real problems of asylum and immigration. It will provide a simple and robust system for economic migration. It will tighten our rules for permanent settlement to ensure that those who stay bring benefit to the UK. It represents real determination to eliminate illegal entry, illegal working, asylum abuse and people-trafficking gangs, who, through their heinous crimes, gain most from the failures of our system. I commend the strategy to the House.

Charles Clarke: I cannot give the figures for Kent, but I can draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to figure 5 on page 17 of the document that we published today, which clearly shows that, according to the latest estimate, the number of asylum applications in 2004—the most recent year—was about the same as it was in 1996–97. I can also say that when Labour entered office in 1997, we found no serious preparation by the Government then leaving office to deal with the terrible crime of people trafficking, which was the core of the system. The Labour Government have put that at the top of the agenda and established approaches to deal with it. That is to the credit of our Government and to the discredit of the Government that he supported.

Charles Clarke: I am grateful for that Question. My hon. Friend is right. It is important that the approach should go right across Government. For example, we intend to work with our colleagues in the Department of Trade and Industry to ensure that the law is enforced strongly and coherently in relation to employing people who are in the country illegally. We intend to work with our colleagues in the Treasury and elsewhere on establishing a border regime that works extremely carefully. We intend to work with the Department of Health and the Department for Education and Skills to ensure that we have a proper regime for the recruitment of people coming into the country. In relation to housing, it is particularly important that we have that dialogue with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. So we are working right across the range and will continue to do so.

New Clause 3
	 — 
	Racial and religious hatred

Mr. Speaker: With this we may take the following:
	Amendment No. 11, in page 89, line 6, leave out clause 122.
	Amendment No. 12, in page 187, line 34, leave out schedule 10.
	Government amendment No. 106
	Amendment No. 182, in schedule 10, page 189, line 20, at end insert—
	'11A   After section 26 insert—
	"26A   Savings for freedom of speech
	   Nothing in this Part applies to activity which consists of—
	(a)   criticising beliefs, teachings or practices of a religion or its followers, for example, by claiming that they are false or harmful;
	(b)   proselytising one's own religion or urging followers of a different religion to cease practising theirs;
	(c)   expressing irreverent comedic comments about religion or belief, its worship, teaching, practice or observance; or
	(d)   expressing antipathy towards, or dislike of, particular religions or their adherents.".'.
	New clause 4—Blasphemy—
	   'The offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel are abolished.'.
	Amendment No. 7, in title, line 8, after 'orders;', insert
	'to abolish the offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel;'.

David Winnick: I accept entirely the hon. Gentleman's sincerity. Not wishing to be patronising, I accept that he wants to protect his Muslim constituents, as he does others. I do not question that, but I believe that Government amendment No. 106 makes a substantial improvement on the wording by replacing "RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED" with "HATRED AGAINST PERSONS ON RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUNDS". I cannot see why that should be unacceptable.
	I realise that the Government's proposal might face difficulties in the other place and might not come into law before the general election. None the less, despite my reservations and my desire to protect free speech—which I hope that we succeeded in protecting when my Labour colleagues and I supported the law on incitement to racial violence; I am not aware that our country is less free as a result of what we did 35 or 40 years ago—I believe that, on balance, the Government are right to try to protect those who are not currently protected by the Race Relations Act 1976, and I shall vote accordingly.

Hazel Blears: I think that that is very different from inciting hatred against people and all that flows from that—the extremist material that we have seen that is capable of inciting such hatred. I think it perfectly permissible to express those views, although I would not necessarily want to do it myself, but I do not think that it is right for us to be able to incite hatred against individuals.
	People have talked about unrealistic expectations. They have said that we shall see a huge range of vexatious and litigious activity. Safeguards already exist. I do not just mean the reference to the Attorney-General, although he will have to consider the public interest. Guidance will be issued by the Crown Prosecution Service, which will be followed by guidance from the Home Office itself. I want to make absolutely sure that there is no misunderstanding in any group about how the legislation might be used.
	Let me say this to the Liberal Democrats. It is important for people not to misunderstand what this law is about. I am sure that the Liberal Democrats would acknowledge that Iqbal Sacranie, in particular, has now clarified comments made before the Bill was published in July last year. He is now perfectly clear about the fact that this is about protecting people, not beliefs. It is vital for that to be understood.
	I think that amendment No. 106 makes the position much clearer. I oppose amendments Nos. 11 and 12. I also oppose new clause 3, because it takes us no further than the law as it stands, and new clause 4, because I do not think that this is the right time for us to repeal the blasphemy laws. We have said that we will keep the matter under review. There is no consensus in the country on the issue. I believe that 48 per cent. of people polled thought that the blasphemy laws should be repealed, while 38 per cent. thought they should remain or be extended. I do not think that a condition of passing this legislation should be the repeal of the blasphemy laws, although it is right for us to examine the issue regularly.
	There is a difference between us and the Opposition. We feel that it is wrong to stir up hatred against people on the grounds of their religion. Clearly Opposition Members do not feel that that is wrong, and simply want to limit it to racial hatred. We do not think that that goes far enough. I ask the House to resist the new clause and amendments, and to support amendment No. 106.
	It being one and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration, Mr Deputy Speaker, put the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [3 February].

Amendment made: No. 106, in page 187, line 38, leave out 'RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED' and insert
	'HATRED AGAINST PERSONS ON RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUNDS'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Brian Mawhinney: Before my hon. Friend leaves his first point, may I declare a history as one of the five Members of the House who served on the Privy Councillor committee that reviewed the terrorism legislation? Two of my distinguished colleagues from both sides of the House are also currently present. We were led to believe without equivocation that this was an anachronism— cannot, for reasons that the House will understand, reveal what was said to us. We were unanimous in our view that if the Americans can use intercept evidence from this country and we can use French intercept evidence in this country, and if we now know that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner is in favour of using intercept evidence, the argument has moved on. As gently as possible, I hope that he will help the Government to understand that, for the sake of the security of the nation, this new clause ought to be adopted.

Andrew Mitchell: At least my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the Opposition responded, which is more than the Government have done. The Government took more than a year to respond to the publication of three separate reports.
	I shall continue with the quotation from Lord Lloyd:
	"In France I was told that intercept material has proved very valuable in terrorist cases. Thus, some 80 per cent. of the evidence against those suspected of involvement in the 1995 bombings is derived from intercept. Similarly, in Australia interception is regarded as an 'extremely valuable aid to criminal prosecution' . . . 664 prosecutions for offences ranging from murder to serious fraud were based on intercepted material, nearly 500 of those prosecutions being for drug offences. Convictions were obtained in 87 per cent. of the cases. Often, when presented with the evidence of an intercept, the defendant pleads guilty."
	That is Lord Lloyd's considered opinion.
	In Canada, the use of lawful interception evidence in court has been highly successful, with a conviction rate of more than 90 per cent. In 2001, lawful interception access helped to arrest approximately 100 organised criminals and solved 13 murder cases involving those individuals. In 2000, lawful interception access resulted in the seizure of more than $100 million in drugs and the conviction of several criminals for importing or producing drugs.
	In America, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968. Title 3 of that Act contained the first comprehensive federal legislative framework governing electronic surveillance for use in criminal investigations. Between 1987 and 1997, electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to title 3 assisted in the conviction of more than 21,000 criminals. In evidence to the Federal Communications Committee in Washington in 1999, Louis Freeh, director general of the FBI from 1993 to 2001, said:
	"As demonstrated by the lives saved and the important investigations and prosecutions successfully completed, the use of electronic surveillance has served the public extremely well . . . Indeed, law enforcement agencies at all levels of government have uniformly found electronic surveillance to be one the mostimportant—if not the most important—sophisticated investigative tools available to them in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of many types of serious crimes. This tool has been critical in fighting terrorism, organised crime, kidnapping, drug trafficking, public corruption, fraud, and violent crime, and in saving numerous innocent lives. In many of those cases, the criminal activity under investigation could never have been detected, prevented, investigated, or successfully prosecuted without the use of evidence derived from court-authorised electronic surveillance."
	In Britain, a chorus of heavyweight, authoritative and expert opinion—most recently, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair—favours lifting that ban. As I have said, Lord Lloyd recommended lifting the ban on the use of intercept evidence in his review of anti-terrorist legislation in 1996. The recommendation was made again in the debate on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, section 17 of which maintains the ban on the use of intercept evidence in court that was previously contained in the Interception of Communications Act 1985.
	As my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Cambridgeshire (Sir Brian Mawhinney) has said, most recently the Newton committee, which was composed of senior Privy Councillors led by Lord Newton, published a report into the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 on 18 December 2003. That report recommended that the blanket ban on the use of intercepted communications in court should be relaxed. Lord Newton and his highly experienced colleagues concluded:
	"In our view, one way of making it possible to prosecute in more cases would be to remove the UK's self-imposed blanket ban on the use of intercepted communications in court. This was also the view reached by Lord Lloyd . . . to which we have seen no convincing response and by Lord Carlile when giving evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on his review of the Operation of Part 4 (of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001)."
	The Government did not accept the case for removing the ban on the use of intercepted communications as evidence when the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 replaced the Interception of Communications Act 1985. The reasons given were, essentially, that allowing the use of intercepted communications as evidence would reveal the authorities' capabilities, prompting criminals to take more effective evasive action.
	The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 forbids the use of domestic intercepts in UK court proceedings, but no such bar exists to the use of foreign intercepts obtained in accordance with foreign laws. Bugged, as opposed to intercepted, communications or the products of surveillance or eavesdropping are also not barred, even if they were not authorised and were an interference with privacy. There is no bar on foreign courts using British intercept evidence, if the intelligence and security services are prepared to provide it.

Paul Farrelly: As the hon. Gentleman knows, I have some sympathy with his argument because I served on the Committee that considered the admissibility of "white evidence". Will he explain why in Committee he advanced a narrow and tightly drawn amendment, whereas he is now introducing a coach-and-horse amendment without any of the safeguards that he and other Opposition Members proposed in Committee?

Andrew Mitchell: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. In Committee, I was seeking to take a narrow view and test the opinion of the Committee. Since then I have talked to right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House and to lawyers outside the House. I have decided that a more permissive amendment would be appropriate. That is why I am speaking to the amendment.
	I was explaining that proper procedures and safeguards for non-disclosure are already in place. The House will know that, as a general rule, the prosecution has to disclose all material that it possesses—for and against its case. However, under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, applications can be made to the court when there is a dispute about whether the prosecution should disclose certain material in the public interest. When the prosecution prepares its list of materials to hand over to the defence, it can indicate which material it considers it need not disclose because of public interest immunity. It must also consider the relevance of the material. Where vast quantities of intercept are not relevant to any issue relating to the case, the disclosure rules do not require that this material be disclosed, irrespective of any question of public interest immunity.
	To protect against any compromise in national security or to protect sources' lives, the prosecution's duty to disclose evidence is limited, so it need not disclose material where the public interest so dictates. In some cases, the prosecution will take the view that the material should be withheld—for example, where it so sensitive that it is subject to public interest immunity. The prosecution must have genuine arguments for not disclosing material on public interest immunity grounds, which provide added protection for the defendant.
	Public interest immunity also helps the UK to co-operate with other countries, because it allows the police and other prosecuting bodies to keep out of court sensitive material that other countries do not want published. So contrary to the Government's claim, the use of intercept material would not have a negative effect on the relationship between British and foreign security agencies.

David Heath: The intervention from the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly), who asked why the hon. Gentleman decided to extend the new clause to cover a wider range of offences, was a relevant one. But surely the answer is that there is no logic in restricting such a provision to terrorist offences, as the hon. Gentleman did in Committee—indeed, originally I shared his view—if one has the twin locks of the warrant concerning the acquisition of such information, and immunity from disclosure on public interest grounds?

Chris Smith: As a member of Lord Newton's Privy Counsellor review committee, I should tell the hon. Gentleman that, with great respect, I believe that he has not got this new clause completely right and I shall not support it in the Division Lobby. However, many Labour Members are concerned about this issue and hope that the Home Secretary will give it very careful consideration in the coming months. Anything that gives us an alternative to the draconian method of locking people up without proper trial and charge—be it in Belmarsh or in their own home—is devoutly to be desired.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take the following:
	Amendment (b) to new clause 10, after second 'to' insert
	'an animal research organisation or'.——
	Amendment (a) to new clause 10, in line 15, leave out
	'loss or damage of any description'
	and insert 'significant loss or damage'.
	Government new clause 11—Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation—
	'(1) A person (A) commits an offence if, with the intention of causing a second person (B) to abstain from doing something which B is entitled to do (or to do something which B is entitled to abstain from doing)—
	(a) A threatens B that A or somebody else will do a relevant act, and
	(b) A does so wholly or mainly because B is a person falling within subsection (2).
	(2) A person falls within this subsection if he is—
	(a) an employee or officer of an animal research organisation;
	(b) a student at an educational establishment that is an animal research organisation;
	(c) a lessor or licensor of any premises occupied by an animal research organisation;
	(d) a person with a financial interest in an animal research organisation;
	(e) a customer or supplier of an animal research organisation;
	(f) a person who is contemplating becoming someone within paragraph (c), (d) or (e);
	(g) a person who is, or is contemplating becoming, a customer or supplier of someone within paragraph (c), (d), (e) or (f);
	(h) an employee or officer of someone within paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g);
	(i) a person with a financial interest in someone within paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g);
	(j) a spouse, civil partner, friend or relative of, or a person who is known personally to, someone within any of paragraphs (a) to (i);
	(k) a person who is, or is contemplating becoming, a customer or supplier of someone within paragraph (a), (b), (h), (i) or (j); or
	(l) an employer of someone within paragraph (j).
	(3) For the purposes of this section an "officer" of an animal research organisation or a person includes—
	(a) where the organisation or person is a body corporate, a director, manager or secretary;
	(b) where the organisation or person is a charity, a charity trustee (within the meaning of the Charities Act 1993);
	(c) where the organisation or person is a partnership, a partner.
	(4) For the purposes of this section—
	(a) a person is a customer or supplier of another person if he purchases goods, services or facilities from, or (as the case may be) supplies goods, services or facilities to, that other; and
	(b) "supplier" includes a person who supplies services in pursuance of any enactment that requires or authorises such services to be provided.
	(5) For the purposes of this section, a "relevant act" is—
	(a) an act amounting to a criminal offence, or
	(b) a tortious act causing B or another person to suffer loss or damage of any description.
	(6) The Secretary of State may by order amend this section so as to include within subsection (2) any description of persons framed by reference to their connection with—
	(a) an animal research organisation, or
	(b) any description of persons for the time being mentioned in that subsection.
	(7) This section does not apply to any act done wholly or mainly in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.
	(8) In subsection (7) "trade dispute" has the meaning given by section (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation).'.
	Amendment (b) to new clause 11, after 'act' in subsection (1)(a), insert
	'or A or someone at the instigation of A does a relevant act,'.
	Amendment (c) to new clause 11, at end, insert
	'(c)   "a person with a financial interest" includes a person undertaking any regulated activity or who is an authorised person within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c. 8).'.
	Amendment (a) to new clause 11, in subsection (5)(b), leave out
	'loss or damage of any description'
	and insert 'significant loss or damage'.
	Government new clause 12—Penalty for offences under sections (interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation).
	Government new clause 13—Animal research organisations.
	Government new clause 14—Extension of sections (interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation).
	New clause 5—Economic damage to companies—
	'(1)   A person ("person A") commits an offence under this section if by acting in accordance with subsection (2) he causes financial damage to another person ("person B"), with the purpose of representing to person B, or persuading person B—
	(i)   that he should not do something that he is legally entitled to do; or
	(ii)   that he should do something that he is not under any legal obligation to do.
	(2)   A person acts in accordance with this subsection if those actions—
	(a)   involve the harassment of or violence against person B or a connected person, or
	(b)   involve damage to property of person B or a connected person.
	(3)   A connected person, for the purposes of subsection (2) above, means—
	(a)   a customer of person B;
	(b)   a shareholder of person B;
	(c)   an employee of person B;
	(d)   a director of person B;
	(e)   where person B is a partnership, its partners;
	(f)   a supplier of goods or services to person B;
	(g)   a supplier of goods or services to persons within paragraph (f) above;
	(h)   an individual normally residing with any individual falling within paragraphs (a) to (g) above.
	(4)   A constable may arrest without warrant anyone whom he reasonably suspects to be committing an offence within subsection (1) above.
	(5)   A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
	(a)   on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
	(b)   on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.
	Government amendments Nos. 99 and 100
	Amendment No. 8, in title, line 8, after 'orders;', insert
	'to make provision in connection with economic damage to companies;'.
	Government amendment No. 110.

Caroline Flint: I said that I would come back to the point raised by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, and I shall.
	If leaflets contain material deemed threatening or offensive, the threatening limb of the intimidation offence may be engaged, but most people involved in peaceful legitimate protest make their argument against an activity without threatening or intimidating the people involved. I hope that that clarifies the provision.
	Opposition amendment (b) to new clause 11 proposes to extend the offence in the new clause. The amendment would not extend the offence significantly, since the words it inserts would still be governed by the preamble to subsection (1), namely
	"with the intention of causing a second person (B) to abstain from doing something which B is entitled to do (or to do something which B is entitled to abstain from doing)".
	The amendment would expressly catch a case where an unlawful act was accompanied by the threat of further unlawful acts unless the victim yielded. That situation is more than adequately covered by new clause 11. Furthermore, our definition of a person with a financial interest for the purpose of new clause 11 is simple and straightforward and I am not convinced that it needs to be changed as proposed in amendment (c).
	New clause 12 proposes a maximum five year sentence for both the offences. We do not propose such a long maximum sentence lightly. We do so because we think that the campaigns of the extremists are very serious and designed to disturb peoples' peace of mind and coerce them. New clause 13 defines an animal research organisation for the purposes of the amendment. It includes the employers of those who hold individual or project licences for research under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 or are specified in certificates issued in respect of places that may be used for breeding and supplying animals for research, and the owners or lessors of the places where they work.
	We believe that the tactics being used by animal rights extremists are so serious that tough new measures are needed to address them. There is a pattern of behaviour and an organised network of people carrying out well planned unlawful acts. That is why we are restricting the scope of the clause to persons connected to animal research organisations. Various views on that were expressed during our debate in Standing Committee. We recognise that, in future, there might be other, similar campaigns by extremists affecting organisations working in other fields. New clause 14 therefore proposes that the offences be capable of extension by means of an order subject to the affirmative procedure, if it can be shown that there has been a series of incidents that would have been offences under the new provisions had they been committed against someone connected to an animal experimenting company. We believe that that will provide adequate safeguards to ensure that the new offences are extended only where necessary and appropriate.
	We are mindful that the provisions of the new clauses are historic in that they tackle certain types of protest. We realise that many people outside the House are concerned that they will affect peaceful and legitimate debate and protest. I hope that they will accept my assurances that the provisions will not do so. We are responding to a specific problem that has emerged: we are faced with a group of people who have developed cowardly tactics of attacking vulnerable third parties to put pressure on organisations carrying out research involving animals. Our new clauses are a targeted and proportionate response to their campaign. The penalties provided reflect the appalling consequences of the campaign on the commercial partners, customers and suppliers of animal research organisations, and the relatives and friends of those associated with research organisations.
	Government amendments Nos. 99, 100 and 110 are consequential on new clauses 10 to 14.
	I fully understand the concern and thinking that lie behind new clause 5 and I am sympathetic to them. The new clause is clearly designed to protect any company or other undertaking that is the target of harassment, violence or criminal damage that then results in it being caused financial damage. However, we have a major concern about the new clause: it is clear that it would be triggered only when financial damage had actually been suffered. The offences in our own new clauses are triggered by threats to take unlawful action—that is a crime or a tort causing damage—aimed at specified persons connected with an animal research organisation; there is therefore no requirement for the person to have suffered damage. We are trying to prevent the damage taking hold. The measure that we propose does not rest, as new clause 5 does, upon being able to show that damage has been caused.
	In addition, I am not convinced that the list of connected persons set out in new clause 5 is comprehensive enough. We are concerned that it could be exploited by those seeking to target particular companies. I therefore oppose new clause 5 and amendment No. 8, which would amend the long title of the Bill. I am sympathetic to the thinking that lies behind the proposals, which is why the Government have introduced their own measures to protect companies. I hope that hon. Members will discern the similarities between new clause 5 and Government new clause 10.
	The Government new clauses will provide significant additional protection for animal research organisations so that they can continue their vital service to the health of the nation. I hope that they will have the full support of the House.

Jonathan Djanogly: I welcome the progress made both during and after the Committee stage on issues relating to animal rights extremism. We will now have in the Bill provisions that, if it is enacted, should provide extra assistance in protecting the public from the campaigns of violence and intimidation being waged by animal rights extremists. The measures will make it an offence to harass two or more people on separate occasions; they should also help to prevent the harassment of a person in his home, although the Bill as it stands does not extend that protection to a person's workplace, where many such incidents occur.
	I thank the Minister for having taken the time to meet me last week to discuss the new clauses that the Government have now tabled. In normal circumstances, we would have hoped for a far more substantial period of consultation—not least to consider the legal language and concepts in the new clauses, which are both novel and complicated. None the less, my hon. Friends and I welcome the Government's decision to table the additional measures to combat animal rights terrorism. They seem finally to have realised the need to tackle a disturbing trend in the activities of animal rights terrorists.
	I know from my constituency and elsewhere that the last few years have brought increasing numbers of attacks on so-called secondary and tertiary targets. Primary targets—the animal research organisations themselves, such as Huntingdon Life Sciences—have been able to make progress, albeit at great cost, in the fight against the criminals. By increasing the use of injunctions against known terror groups, they have been able significantly to reduce the incidence of attacks on their facilities and their staff.
	However, the result of those successes has been a switch in the tactics used by those desperate groups and individuals. Before, they attacked the animal researchers in their laboratories; now, the easier option for the terrorists, which enables them to avoid the injunctions, is to unleash violence and intimidation on people away from their place of business—for instance, in their homes, furtively and in the middle of night— or against anyone seen to be in any way connected to the research organisations. Such secondary targets could include a building contractor working on the primary research facility. Even more tenuously, a tertiary target could be as distant as a fund manager maintaining a shareholding in that building company, or even, as was the case in Staffordshire, a pub frequented by workers at the secondary target.
	I was recently made aware of an example involving Fidelity, one of the world's largest fund management companies. In the UK, Fidelity was targeted by animal rights extremists who disrupted a key part of its business activities—a roadshow event, in which it marketed its products to independent financial advisers. The so-called justification for that action was Fidelity's investment activity. It was enough that it had invested in BOC, which in turn had a business relationship with Huntingdon Life Sciences. BOC, of course, has since withdrawn its custom from HLC. Unsurprisingly, individuals and businesses in that chain are struggling to cope with the barrage of violence that is unleashed against them because they are perceived to be connected with the main target. As I pointed out on Second Reading, many targeted companies have agreed to sever their links with animal research organisations.
	Few organisations can afford the effort and the tens of thousands of pounds required to obtain injunctions. Indeed, many companies that could afford injunctions are reluctant to obtain them as they regard it as the role of the state to defend them and their employees. Accordingly, many companies have been forced, often with great reluctance, to abandon perfectly legal business operations—out of necessity, they believe—so that they can safeguard their employees and their premises. Along with a number of individuals and groups I have, for a number of years, highlighted the urgent need to extend the law to protect these wider victims of animal rights terrorism. Groups representing city institutions, such as the National Association of Pension Funds, are waiting to take their lead from Government, so naturally I am delighted that the Government have finally decided to heed the calls for action. To put it simply: better late than never.
	Government new clause 10, entitled "Interference with contractual relationships so as to harm animal research organisation", would make it a criminal offence for someone to carry out or threaten to carry out a criminal or tortious act intended to cause, or likely to cause, the victim not to enter into a contract with a third party, or to breach an existing contract. A tortious act is a non-criminal act, for which damages are usually claimed in a civil court. For someone to be liable for the offence they must act with the intention of harming an animal research organisation. Harming in this context means causing any type of loss or damage to theorganisation or, alternatively, hindering that organisation in carrying out any of its activities. I am pleased that the Government have come round to the idea of introducing a measure to protect the economic interests of those affected by extremists. It is those very economic interests that animal rights terror groups unjustly seek to destroy.
	The clause clearly springs from the foundations provided by various people in recent months. The Minister mentioned new clause 5, which my hon. Friends and I tabled and which is in many respects similar to Government new clause 10. Overall, we support the Government new clause as well as the other Government new clauses, but there are a number of areas on which we would be grateful for clarification. First, can the Minister confirm that the definition of a person in Government new clauses 10 and 11 is intended to cover legal as well as natural persons—in other words, companies? If not, the Government will not have gone as far as I aimed to go in new clause 5, which would have provided protection for companies.
	On the other hand, if companies are covered, would the drafting of new clause 10 mean that the perpetrator of the offence, person A, could be a company or a non-registered group such as Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty—SHAC? That is important, because SHAC has often claimed that it cannot be prosecuted because it is not an organisation as such. We welcome the step-by-step requirements that apply to the offence in Government new clauses 10 and 11, including the carrying out or threatening of a wrongful act, the resulting damage to a contractual relationship or intended relationship, and the necessary intention on the part of the perpetrator.
	The need for all those requirements to be met should protect against wrongful convictions, but has the Minister considered the practical difficulties in establishing all those steps satisfactorily so that convictions can be secured? There is no point in having available new offences with which to charge people if it proves too difficult to secure convictions. I should be grateful for clarification about whom the new clause is intended to protect.
	The drafting of subsection (2) is entirely free of ambiguity—

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point, and I shall come on to deal with the width of the provision. None the less, it sets out a series of steps, and the Minister should consider whether the process will be satisfactory in securing convictions.
	Our amendment (b) aims to maximise the protection afforded by Government new clause 10. I accept what the Minister said, but the new clause may require further review. We will not, however, push the matter to a vote. In the scenario envisaged in subsection (2) the actions or threats of the perpetrator—person A—would have to damage the contractual arrangements between the victim, known as person B, and a third person known as person C. A tertiary target would appear to be covered by that drafting.
	Take, for example, a company supplying building materials to a building contractor working at an animal research facility. If the supplier were forced to terminate the contract to supply the builders, they would be protected as person B. What is the position of secondary targets? I cannot imagine that the Government have deliberately sought to exclude them, but the drafting may leave room for that possibility, because the term "animal research organisation" is specifically used in the provision. The question is whether those research organisations would fall within the definition of "a third person". In my example, would the contractual relationship between the building contractor and the animal research facility be protected? We would be grateful if the Minister addressed that point.
	We have another query about Government new clauses 10 and 11. As an alternative to a criminal act, both clauses would allow for the offending act to be a tortious act that causes the victim to suffer loss or damage of any description. Could the Minister explain whether the intention is to catch the many and varied torts that exist under English law? Perhaps what was originally envisaged was trespass against the person, such as assault, or trespass on land. Defamation is also a tort—was the intention that threatening to libel someone would be enough to form the basis of the offence? The Minister gave the example of neighbours being wrongfully and shamefully informed by SHAC that a targeted individual was a paedophile. I will not go into any further legal details, but I would be grateful if the Minister addressed that issue.
	Liberal Democrat amendment (a) to Government new clause 10—the same wording is used in amendment (a) to new clause 11—aims to quantify loss or damage, presumably so that minor tortious acts are not caught. I sympathise with that approach, but it is rather a blunt instrument. I acknowledge, however, that the other place may wish to review the issue in greater detail. The offence created by Government new clause 11 would arise where person A intimidates person B because B is connected with an animal research organisation. A connected person would include employees and their family members, customers and suppliers. The intimidation would be a threat by person A that they, or someone else, would commit a criminal or tortious act causing loss or damage of some description. The perpetrator's intention must be to cause the victim to abstain from doing something that he is entitled to do, or to do something that he is entitled not to do.
	Will the Minister clarify the meaning of
	"a person with a financial interest in an animal research organisation"
	in new clause 11? We took that to include shareholders. In amendment (c) to new clause 11, we propose the insertion of a new paragraph to ensure that the provision covers anyone who is undertaking any regulated activity or who is an authorised person under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, including fund managers. The Minister said that that was already covered, and I am grateful for her clarification.
	Amendment (b) would insert additional wording in subsection (l)(a) of Government new clause 11, and aims to equalise the protection offered by the two new clauses. It seems that in new clause 10, the carrying out of, as well as a threat to carry out, a criminal or tortious act would allow for conviction where contractual relationships were affected. Yet new clause 11 appears to contain a loophole, as it refers only to threatening, rather than carrying out, a criminal or tortious act. In theory, if an animal rights extremist carried out an act to intimidate someone, without having first threatened them, would they not be caught under the provision? If that were the case, some of the connected persons listed in new clause 11 might be protected by new clause 10. However, that would be the case only if they were involved in a contractual relationship that they had been forced to breach, abandon or not enter into as a result of intimidation. For other types of connected person, such as spouses or friends, new clause 10 with its focus on contracts would be of no use.
	In new clause 12, we welcome the proposed five-year maximum sentence for offences under new clauses 10 and 11. That rightly reflects the seriousness with which those activities should be treated. Similarly, we agree with the Government's proposal to require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for proceedings to commence. That seems a sensible way to address the politically contentious nature of this matter, which requires a fair balance to be struck between the right to non-violent freedom of expression, the need to protect individuals and businesses from unacceptable criminality, and the need to achieve a degree of standardisation across the country.
	Subject to the issues that I have raised, it will be clear to the House that on the whole, my hon. Friends and I support the Government's proposals. However, those proposals do not go far enough. In particular, without detracting in any way from the need to protect individuals, I argue that further protection for company activity is needed. In Committee I tabled a number of amendments that would have provided that, but they did not receive Government support. Confidentiality orders should extend beyond directors to prevent the identity of threatened company shareholders being made available to the public. The need for that cannot be better demonstrated than by citing the example of HLS, which was forced to undertake the burden of re-listing in Maryland in the USA, because that jurisdiction allowed shareholder details to be kept out of the public domain. Similarly, we sought to protect the identity of lenders to companies, as their details allow them to be singled out as secondary targets.
	Most significantly, by tabling new clause 5 on Report we sought to introduce an offence of causing economic damage to companies. For the first time, that would have specifically protected all companies and connected persons from the financial damage resulting from harassment, violence and damage to the property. In new clause 14 the Government propose that their new offences could be extended by way of delegated legislation to organisations involved in areas other than animal research. Although we accept that the Government are taking legislation further down the road, we do not believe that this piecemeal approach goes far enough. There are already industries other than animal research that are suffering at the hands of extremists. Where animal research organisations are suffering today, other industries will follow. Road builders and leather manufacturers are just two examples that spring to mind.
	I was recently updated about the continuing economic sabotage faced by companies in the agricultural biotechnology industry. The Government require full testing of genetically modified crops, yet with the difficulties in providing continuous security there seem to be few means of protecting their destruction by activists. Furthermore, companies and their staff have been targeted by means of the same tactics as those employed by animal rights groups. I was told that links have been uncovered between the targeting of the GM and the animal research industries by the same people. By limiting their new clause to animal research, the Government have failed to appreciate the pressing issues arising in other areas.
	However, the introduction of new legislation by the Government is a positive step, and we will support the economic damage provisions. Accordingly, I shall not press our alternative new clause 5 to a Division, although in recognition of the lack of consultation and the drafting amendments required to new clause 11, I shall press amendment (b) to that new clause, keeping in mind the need for the other place to consult on those provisions during the passage of the Bill.
	Finally, new laws are far from the whole answer. A much wider range of tactics must be adopted if we are to become more effective at dealing with the threats from economic extremists. A code for protesters similar to the existing picketing code could allow for legitimate protest, while freeing police and court resources. Judges and the police should have best practice guidance to ensure that there is a consistent approach to arrest, conviction and sentencing, not least in relation to new clauses 10 and 11. Two terrorists were jailed after orchestrating a campaign of thousands of telephone calls to research companies to block their lines. Imagine the industry's horror when those criminals' sentences were recently slashed on appeal.
	Police forces must have adequate funding and training to make use of existing legislation, and any new measures that make it on to the statute book will need to be properly funded. Overstretched local Crown Prosecution Service lawyers can be left vulnerable in the face of experienced lawyers acting, often pro bono, on behalf of accused protesters. Almost a year ago the Government promised a team of specialist central prosecutors to deal with this issue. Where are they? I do not see them. We do not believe that the national extremism tactical co-ordination unit receives nearly enough resources to allow it to deal with such matters effectively. I do not want to state in public the number of people involved with the unit or the time that they spend on their work, but the Minister knows what those numbers are and how inadequate the situation is. All these examples are aspects that must be addressed. The actions of a tiny minority must not be allowed to continue to blight the lives of individuals and the workings of companies. Leadership and further action from the Government are called for without delay.

David Heath: I welcome the Government's engagement with the issue. We have made progress, and careful consideration has been given to points made in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) and myself, among others. We all want to ensure that the law is adequate to provide protection for people going about their proper business. At the same time we want to ensure that the proper ability to protest is not curtailed. There is a world of difference between somebody who is protesting in a proper way about something that they feel strongly about, and somebody who is engaged in criminal activity in order to intimidate others into doing things that they would not otherwise do.
	We welcome the provisions of the new clauses, but because they were not tabled in Committee—this is not a criticism—we must now ask some of the questions that we would otherwise have asked at an earlier stage. I want some small clarifications of the drafting. That will be relevant when the matter is discussed in another place, where I am sure it will be examined more carefully.
	In new clause 10(1) there is a slightly novel approach in the reference to an act or threat that is
	"intended or likely to cause a second person (B) to take any of the steps in subsection (2)."
	The mens rea is deferred, so to speak. Somebody has committed what is considered to be a criminal offence or a tortious act, but they may not have the intention ascribed to the initiator, nor may the person who initiated the act, in the case of another person. There is a slight legal quandary there which needs further explanation and exploration.
	I queried the difference in subsection (3)(a) and (b) between
	"an act amounting to a criminal offence"
	and
	"a tortious act",
	which is not described as an act amounting to a tortious act. We have not received an answer to that, but we will get one in due course.
	I am worried about the rather wide definition of a tortious act and what is included in it. When the Minister was trying to explain, she mentioned a serious libel—in fact I think it was a criminal libel, but I am not enough of a lawyer to remember which categories constitute criminal libel. I thought that accusing someone of an indictable offence was one of those categories. Clearly, the provision will catch simple defamation. Perhaps the hon. Lady will confirm that. My hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon made the point that tort could include simple trespass, which would be unlikely to cause significant loss or damage. Hence our probing amendment to establish w otherwise hat was intended to fall into that category.
	Subsection (5)(b) contains a very wide definition:
	"to prevent or hinder the carrying out by the organisation of any of its activities."
	I want the measure to be an effective tool to fight a particular abuse. I do not want it to be infinitely extendable to inappropriate purposes. Preventing or hindering the carrying out of any activity is an extremely wide provision, and I expect those in another place to examine it closely.
	I shall close now because, sadly, we are running out of time, as has been the case during all our debates today, which I regret. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) said that he would press his amendment (b) to new clause 11 to a Division. My understanding is that he intends to ensure that it is an offence under new clause 11 for a tortious act to be committed—in other words, one of the two categories, but not that which amounts to a criminal offence, because it clearly is a criminal offence by definition—rather than threatened. Will the Minister explain whether she believes that that is covered elsewhere, and if so, how? Otherwise, I shall support the hon. Gentleman's amendment.

Caroline Flint: We have had a useful debate exploring the nature of people engaged in acts against those working directly for animal research organisations and those associated with them. There is common agreement that we have got to the point where we have to do something about that issue.
	I remind the House that during the past year there has been a step change in how the police, the prosecution services and others have been working together to deal with one of the points raised by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), which is that we can have the laws, but we also have to have enforcement. When we are dealing with people who come in the dead of night to vandalise other people's property and throw acid on their cars, trying to build the evidence base to bring successful prosecutions to court is not easy. It has been particularly difficult when they have taken action against people in supply companies in different parts of the country.
	We have made huge progress in this area with the establishment of the national extremist tactical unit in Cambridge, which is not considering the issue piecemeal, but is connecting the intelligence from a variety of activities and actions involving those people throughout the country. That is why we are starting to see better use of court time to prosecute. There has also been the use of antisocial behaviour orders by communities to see what justice they can get. Let us not forget that other measures were agreed in Committee to tackle harassment and protests outside people's homes, which should be seen as part of the package. I wanted to say that because I did not think it was right to let it pass, considering some of the comments about inactivity.
	I shall try to deal with some of the points that have been made. In the short time I have, I shall probably not do them justice, but I am sure the issue will come back in another place. I am happy to continue to discuss matters with Opposition spokespeople afterwards as well. I was asked whether building contractors working for animal research organisations would be caught, and the answer is yes. The issue was raised as to whether new clause 11 covers unlawful acts or only threats of them. The proposal is specifically aimed at tackling intimidation, but we shall further consider the points made this evening to ensure that we have got that right.
	I was also asked what the term "person" covers. It refers to any person who can be identified in law, including companies, other corporate bodies and unincorporated associations. It should be remembered that some crimes and torts can be committed only by real people.
	A question was raised as to whether the Government intend to catch all tortious acts. The answer is no, only tortious acts that cause loss or damage. As was mentioned, some torts such as trespass may or may not result in loss or damage. We have tried to confine what can be a broad area of actions in terms of law.
	The term,
	"a person with a financial interest",
	which appears in new clause 11, means anyone with a financial interest, including an owner, a shareholder, a bond holder and so on. I hope that clarifies the matter.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked about the wording of new clause 10, which refers to
	"an act amounting to a criminal offence".
	The words have been chosen to make the language precise, because the provisions refer to "a relevant act"; we wanted to give some more detail on that. The definition is of a relevant act, so both subsections 3(a) and 3(b) refer to an act that amounts to a criminal offence and a tortious act. There is nothing unusual in that wording, which is intended to make the clause more precise.
	The hon. Gentleman also asked whether "tortious act" catches defamation. It does, provided that loss or damage has been caused. That is the key issue. He asked another question on the same point: what amounts to a criminal offence? It means doing something in circumstances that make it a criminal offence—
	It being three and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration of the Bill, Madam Deputy Speaker, pursuant to Order [3 February], put forthwith the question already proposed from the Chair.
	Question agreed to.
	Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
	New Clause 11
	Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation
	'(1) A person (A) commits an offence if, with the intention of causing a second person (B) to abstain from doing something which B is entitled to do (or to do something which B is entitled to abstain from doing)—
	(a) A threatens B that A or somebody else will do a relevant act, and
	(b) A does so wholly or mainly because B is a person falling within subsection (2).
	(2) A person falls within this subsection if he is—
	(a) an employee or officer of an animal research organisation;
	(b) a student at an educational establishment that is an animal research organisation;
	(c) a lessor or licensor of any premises occupied by an animal research organisation;
	(d) a person with a financial interest in an animal research organisation;
	(e) a customer or supplier of an animal research organisation;
	(f) a person who is contemplating becoming someone within paragraph (c), (d) or (e);
	(g) a person who is, or is contemplating becoming, a customer or supplier of someone within paragraph (c), (d), (e) or (f);
	(h) an employee or officer of someone within paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g);
	(i) a person with a financial interest in someone within paragraph (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g);
	(j) a spouse, civil partner, friend or relative of, or a person who is known personally to, someone within any of paragraphs (a) to (i);
	(k) a person who is, or is contemplating becoming, a customer or supplier of someone within paragraph (a), (b), (h), (i) or (j); or
	(l) an employer of someone within paragraph (j).
	(3) For the purposes of this section an "officer" of an animal research organisation or a person includes—
	(a) where the organisation or person is a body corporate, a director, manager or secretary;
	(b) where the organisation or person is a charity, a charity trustee (within the meaning of the Charities Act 1993);
	(c) where the organisation or person is a partnership, a partner.
	(4) For the purposes of this section—
	(a) a person is a customer or supplier of another person if he purchases goods, services or facilities from, or (as the case may be) supplies goods, services or facilities to, that other; and
	(b) "supplier" includes a person who supplies services in pursuance of any enactment that requires or authorises such services to be provided.
	(5) For the purposes of this section, a "relevant act" is—
	(a) an act amounting to a criminal offence, or
	(b) a tortious act causing B or another person to suffer loss or damage of any description.
	(6) The Secretary of State may by order amend this section so as to include within subsection (2) any description of persons framed by reference to their connection with—
	(a) an animal research organisation, or
	(b) any description of persons for the time being mentioned in that subsection.
	(7) This section does not apply to any act done wholly or mainly in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.
	(8) In subsection (7) "trade dispute" has the meaning given by section (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation).'.—[Caroline Flint.]
	Brought up, and read the First and Second time.
	Amendment proposed to the proposed new clause: (b), in line 4, after "act", insert
	"or A or someone at the instigation of A does a relevant act,".—[Mr. Djanogly.]

Question accordingly negatived.
	Clause added to the Bill.
	New Clause 12
	Penalty for offences under sections (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation)
	'(1) A person guilty of an offence under section (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) or (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation) is liable—
	(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
	(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or to both.
	(2) No proceedings for an offence under either of those sections may be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.'.—[Caroline Flint.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
	New Clause 13
	Animal research organisations
	'(1) For the purposes of sections (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation) "animal research organisation" means any person or organisation falling within subsection (2) or (3).
	(2) A person or organisation falls within this subsection if he or it is the owner, lessee or licensee of premises constituting or including—
	(a) a place specified in a licence granted under section 4 or 5 of the 1986 Act,
	(b) a scientific procedure establishment designated under section 6 of that Act, or
	(c) a breeding or supplying establishment designated under section 7 of that Act.
	(3) A person or organisation falls within this subsection if he or it employs, or engages under a contract for services, any of the following in his capacity as such—
	(a) the holder of a personal licence granted under section 4 of the 1986 Act,
	(b) the holder of a project licence granted under section 5 of that Act,
	(c) a person specified under section 6(5) of that Act, or
	(d) a person specified under section 7(5) of that Act.
	(4) The Secretary of State may by order amend this section so as to include a reference to any description of persons whom he considers to be involved in, or to have a direct connection with persons who are involved in, the application of regulated procedures.
	(5) In this section—
	"the 1986 Act" means the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (c. 14);
	"organisation" includes any institution, trust, undertaking or association of persons;
	"premises" includes any place within the meaning of the 1986 Act;
	"regulated procedures" has the meaning given by section 2 of the 1986 Act.'. .—[Caroline Flint.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
	New Clause 14
	Extension of sections (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation)
	'(1) The Secretary of State may by order provide for sections (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation), (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation) and (Penalty for offences under sections (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation)) to apply in relation to persons or organisations of a description specified in the order as they apply in relation to animal research organisations.
	(2) The Secretary of State may, however, only make an order under this section if satisfied that a series of acts has taken place and—
	(a) that those acts were directed at persons or organisations of the description specified in the order or at persons having a connection with them, and
	(b) that, if those persons or organisations had been animal research organisations, those acts would have constituted offences under section (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) or (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation).
	(3) In this section "organisation" and "animal research organisation" have the same meanings as in section (Animal research organisations).'. .—[Caroline Flint.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
	Clause 154
	Orders and regulations
	Amendment made: No. 99, in page 119, line 1, at end insert—
	'(   )   any order under section (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation)(6), (Animal research organisations)(4) or (Extension of sections (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation);'.—[Caroline Flint.]
	Clause 157
	Penalties for offences: transitional modification for England and Wales
	Amendment made: No. 100, in page 120, line 14, at end insert—
	'(   )   section (Penalty for offences under sections (Interference with contractual relations so as to harm animal research organisation) and (Intimidation of persons connected with animal research organisation))(1)(a).'.—[Caroline Flint.]
	Title
	Amendment made: No. 110, in title, line 9, after 'police;', insert
	'to make provision for protecting certain organisations from interference with their activities;'. —[Caroline Flint.]
	New Clause 7
	Police members of SOCA to have powers of constable etc.
	'(1)   A police member of SOCA—
	(a)   shall have the powers of a constable;
	(b)   subject to subsection (2) below, may have the customs powers of an officer of Revenue and Customs;
	(c)   subject to subsection (3) below, may have the immigration powers of an immigration officer.
	(2)   A police member of SOCA may exercise the customs powers of an officer of Revenue and Customs only if he has previously exercised those powers or has received such training as would otherwise entitle him to exercise those powers.
	(3)   A police member of SOCA may exercise the immigration powers of an immigration officer only if he has previously exercised those powers or has received such training as would otherwise entitle him to exercise those powers.
	(4)   In this section "police member" means a police member of SOCA appointed in accordance with paragraph 13A of Schedule 1.'.—[Mr. Mitchell.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may take the following:
	Amendment No. 37, in page 23, line 19, leave out clauses 41 to 43.
	Government amendment No. 67.
	Amendment No. 111, in clause 41, page 24, line 1, leave out
	'to be treated as suspended'
	and insert 'maintained'.
	Amendment No. 112, in clause 41, page 24, line 2, leave out
	'revives if (and only if)'
	and insert 'if'.
	Government amendment No. 68.
	Amendment No. 15, in clause 44, page 24, line 26, leave out from 'a' to end of line 27 and insert 'police member of SOCA'.
	Amendment No. 16, in clause 44, page 24, line 28, leave out 'The designated person' and insert 'A police member'.
	Amendment No. 17, in clause 44, page 24, line 29, leave out 'the designated person' and insert 'a police member'.
	Amendment No. 18, in clause 44, page 24, line 36, leave out 'the designated person' and insert 'a police member'.
	Amendment No. 19, in clause 44, page 24, line 39, leave out 'the designated person' and insert 'a police member'.
	Amendment No. 20, in clause 44, page 24, line 40, leave out 'The designated person' and insert 'A police member'.
	Amendment No. 21, in clause 44, page 25, line 3, leave out 'the designated person' and insert 'a police member'.
	Amendment No. 22, in clause 44, page 25, line 5, leave out subsection (8).
	Amendment No. 23, in clause 45, page 25, line 11, leave out 'persons designated' and insert 'police members'.
	Amendment No. 24, in clause 49, page 27, line 26, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 25, in clause 49, page 27, line 27, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 26, in clause 49, page 27, line 30, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 27, in clause 49, page 27, line 31, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 28, in clause 49, page 27, line 34, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 29, in clause 49, page 27, line 36, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 30, in clause 49, page 27, line 38, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 31, in clause 49, page 28, line 7, leave out 'designated person' and insert 'police member'.
	Amendment No. 32, in clause 49, page 28, line 8, leave out 'virtue of the designation' and insert
	'reason of holding the powers'.
	Amendment No. 33, in clause 50, page 28, line 22, leave out 'designated persons' and insert 'police members'.
	Amendment No. 34, in clause 50, page 28, line 33, leave out 'designated persons' and insert 'police members'.
	Amendment No. 35, in clause 52, page 29, leave out lines 21 and 22.
	Amendment No. 36, in clause 52, page 29, line 25, leave out subsection (2).
	Amendment No. 13, in schedule 1, page 126, line 28, after '9)', insert—
	'(aa)   such persons appointed by SOCA under this paragraph as police members of SOCA,'.
	Amendment No. 14, in schedule 1, page 126, line 36, after first 'SOCA', insert
	'or police members of SOCA'.
	Amendment No. 38, in schedule 1, page 128, line 33, at end insert—
	'Police members of SOCA
	13A   A person may be appointed as a police member of SOCA if he is attested or sworn as a constable and—
	(i)   he is a member of a police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996;
	(ii)   he is a member of the Metropolitan Police Force or City of London Police Force;
	(iii)   he is a regular constable within the meaning of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967;
	(iv)   he is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;
	(v)   he is a member of the Ministry of Defence Police appointed on the nomination of the Secretary of State under section 1 of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987;
	(vi)   he is a member of the British Transport Police Force;
	(vii)   he is a member of the States of Jersey Police Force;
	(viii)   he is a member of the salaried Police Force of the Island of Guernsey; or
	(ix)   he is a member of the Isle of Man Constabulary.
	13B(1)   Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, the Secretary of State may make regulations as to the government and administration of SOCA and conditions of service within SOCA.
	(2)   Without prejudice to the generality of sub-paragraph (1), regulations under this paragraph may make provision with respect to—
	(a)   the ranks to be held by police members of SOCA;
	(b)   the promotion of police members of SOCA;
	(c)   voluntary retirement of the police members of SOCA;
	(d)   the efficiency and effectiveness of police members of SOCA;
	(e)   the suspension of police members of SOCA from membership of it and from their office as constables;
	(f)   the maintenance of personal records as members of SOCA;
	(g)   the duties which are or are not to be performed by the police members of SOCA;
	(h)   the treatment of occasions of police duty of attendance at meetings of the Police Federations and of anybody recognised by the Secretary of State for the purposes of sections 64 of the Police Act 1996;
	(i)   the hours of duty, leave, pay and allowances of police members of SOCA; and
	(j)   the issue, use and return of
	(i)   personal equipment and accoutrements; and
	(ii)   police clothing.
	(3)   Regulations under this paragraph for regulating pay and allowances may be made retrospective to any date specified in the Regulations, but nothing in this sub-paragraph shall be construed as authorising the pay or allowances payable to any person to be reduced retrospectively.
	(4)   SOCA may—
	(a)   pay, or make payments in respect of pensions or gratuities to or in respect of any persons who are or have been police members;
	(b)   provide and maintain schemes (whether contributory or not) for the payment of pensions or gratuities to or in respect of any such persons.
	(5)   Before exercising its powers under sub-paragraph (4), SOCA shall have regard to any provision made under the Pensions Act 1976.'.

Andrew Mitchell: The purpose of the amendments is to create a category of front-line officers of SOCA, classed as police members. Under our new clause and amendments, police members would have the powers that police officers, Revenue officers, Customs officers and immigration officers currently exercise. The amendments would remove the confusion that the mix-and-match designations of part 1, chapter 2 anticipate.
	The amendments revert to issues that my hon. Friends and I raised in Standing Committee on 11 January. We listened carefully to the Under-Secretary's response to those amendments. We took her comments into account and our amendments are now a little different from those that we tabled previously. We were encouraged when she told us on Second Reading and in Committee that she would consider drafting amendments on training.
	Some of the Under-Secretary's comments in Committee seemed to us to arise from a misapprehension about the intent and effect of our amendments, and I therefore wish to deal with that misconception at the outset. I believe that the Under-Secretary may have understood our amendments to have the effect that all SOCA staff would have to be police constables. That was a misunderstanding on her part.
	SOCA will have many members of staff, including accountants, forensic scientists and staff who have come from the Crown Prosecution Service. Some staff will come from Customs. Others might come from the Financial Services Authority. No doubt there will be lawyers—probably many lawyers. There will be support staff—secretaries, chiefs of staff and so on. Nobody in their right mind would suggest that they should all be required to hold the post of constable.
	The debate deals with front-line staff. By that I mean those who will exercise powers of entry, investigation, seizure and arrest. The thrust of our amendments is that those front-line staff should hold the office of constable. We do not mean the tea boy, the backroom staff or the lawyers, but those who exercise police powers. They should be constables.
	Lying behind those amendments are some points of fundamental difference between us and the Government. The Under-Secretary said in Committee:
	"SOCA will not be a police force and, consequently, should not be staffed by police officers."—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 11 January 2005; c. 38.]
	She also said:
	"I strongly refute the argument that only police officers can be entrusted with police powers."—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 11 January 2005; c. 37.]
	We disagree with both assertions.
	Let me deal with two crucial matters that need to be understood and fully appreciated before our amendments can be considered. The first is the historical significance and importance of the office of constable. The second is an understanding of the way in which the Bill, as presented, proposes to give what might broadly be described as "police powers" to SOCA staff.
	Although today's police forces are the creation of statute and the police have numerous statutory powers and duties, from a legal point of view, a police force is essentially neither more nor less than several individual constables, whose status derives from the common law. The office of constable dates back to the parish constable, who, by the beginning of the 17th century, was responsible for the preservation of the peace in his bailiwick and for the execution of the orders and warrants of the justices of the peace. The constable's oath and close relationship with the justices of the peace characterised him as a ministerial officer of the Crown, like a sheriff or the JPs themselves, rather than as a local administrative officer. In short, constables have never been civil servants.
	Various enactments were passed in the 19th and 20th centuries, providing for the establishment of police forces. Powers were not conferred on members of police forces as such, but a member of a police force on appointment had to be attested as a constable by making a declaration. A member of a police force now has all the powers and privileges of a constable throughout England and Wales.
	The hallmark of the present day constable therefore remains, as it was in the 17th century, his attestation. Until so attested, constables have neither the authority nor the status of a constable. Once attested, the constable holds that office. That applies equally to members of police forces, special constables, and, of special note, the director general and police members of the National Crime Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad.
	I draw attention to the fact that, when Parliament created NCIS and the NCS, it wisely saw fit to maintain the significance of the office of constable by creating a category of police members of those organisations. The Bill will abolish NCIS and the NCS and absorb those organisations into SOCA. What, then, is the precise status of a police constable?
	When carrying out his duties as a constable, a member of a police force—of whatever rank—acts as an officer of the Crown and a public servant. Constables' powers are exercised by virtue of their office, and unless they are executing a warrant, the powers can be exercised only on their own responsibility. A police constable who deliberately fails to carry out his duties by wilfully omitting to take steps to preserve the Queen's peace or to protect a person under attack commits a criminal offence—the common law offence of misconduct of an officer of justice.
	The Crown is not liable for the wrongful acts of a member of a police force. Although a constable is an officer of the Crown and a public servant, his or her relationship with the Crown is not that of master and servant, nor that of principal and agent. He or she is a servant of the Crown only in the sense that any holder of a public office may be called a servant of the Crown or the state.
	Why does that matter in 2005? The answer is that it has important consequences for the nature of policing and the independence of our police force. Police officers cannot be dismissed on notice; they cannot take industrial action; they have a duty to act and report both on and off duty; and they are completely politically impartial. Those have all been characteristics of our police for at least the past 175 years. They derive from the office of constable. That is of great importance to the nature of policing in Britain.
	Many years ago, it was simple to become a constable. All one had to do was go before a magistrate and take an oath. Today, however, those who exercise police powers undergo extensive training. On being recruited to a police force, constables are appointed on a two-year probationary period. It allows a mix of intensive training at residential centres and training on the beat with a tutor constable. Every new recruit goes through exactly the same basic training programme, which lasts 15 weeks at a national police training centre, followed by further training on the job. Recruits are then on probation for two years before they become fully fledged police officers.
	Training is in four stages. Recruits spend two weeks at their local force training centre familiarising themselves with police procedures and with the law. They then receive their uniform and make an official declaration as a police constable before a local magistrate. There then follows a 15-week intensive residential course, with continuous assessment and exams, strenuous physical activity, self-defence training and teaching of the law. Trainees are taught how to understand the criminal mind, and how to treat people fairly; that is all part of the course. After this, they return to their home force and are allocated an experienced tutor constable who guides them through the routines of police work. Trainees are then considered suitable for independent control, and progress to more advanced training. After two years' probation, they are required to attend further training locally before being appointed to the rank of constable.
	Is that training appropriate? We think that it is. Is it necessary? We think so. However, the Minister seems to think that it is unnecessary. The Bill, as it stands, will allow the director general of SOCA to confer police powers on someone who is not a constable, and who has had none of the training that I have just described. Hon. Members might find that scarcely credible.
	Let me turn to my second point. How does the Bill propose to grant SOCA staff police and other powers? Once we understand the present proposals for equipping SOCA staff with police powers, we immediately see that the Bill will create a deeply unsatisfactory regime, and that a radical rethink is clearly required.
	Clause 41 gives the director general the power to designate a member of staff as a person with the powers of a constable, a customs officer or an immigration officer. Who can be designated in such a way? A safeguard that the person should already have been trained and be qualified to exercise those powers would provide at least some comfort. However, the clause expressly provides that any member of SOCA's staff can be given any, or all, of those powers, whether or not he is already qualified to exercise them. That will be rather like a sheriff in the wild west riding into town and shelling out badges willy-nilly to the locals, regardless of their training.
	Let us look more closely at the process of designating a member of the staff of SOCA as a person having the powers of a constable. In the case of a designated constable, there is no requirement for this second-class constable to take an oath of attestation. He will have the powers of the constable, but not, it seems, their duties and responsibilities. The effect of clause 41(5) will be that, if an employee of SOCA was a constable before he became designated by the director general, his tenure of the office of constable will be suspended. So these second-class constables would be able, it seems, to take industrial action, just as customs and immigration officers can do at present.
	It might appear from clause 44 that a designation as constable brings with it all the powers and privileges of that office, but that is not so. In fact, the designation made by the director general can be made subject to limitations as to the powers exercisable, or as to the purposes for which the powers are exercised. So there will be second-class constables with second-class powers. As I said in Committee, lawyers will have a field day trying to work out whether, in any particular case, the powers exercised by a constable designate were within his authorisation or were exercised for an authorised purpose. This will certainly not help to combat serious or organised crime. Worse still, persons can be designated as constables for a fixed period under clause 41(2)(b), and the designation, even if originally given without a time limit, can always be withdrawn.
	The Police Federation reports that a straw poll of NCS officers shows that an overwhelming 95 per cent. of serving NCS officers stated that they were unwilling to transfer to SOCA. That is hardly surprising. Quite apart from the wholly unsatisfactory nature of the arrangements, from the point of view of those unfortunate enough to be designated as temporary, second-class, limited-power constables, what is the position for those over whom these constables designate seek to exercise their powers? When someone is challenged by a police officer, they are surely entitled to know what the powers of that constable are. Improper exercise of police powers is rare, and the fact that anyone can discover, if they wish to, what powers a police officer has, by virtue of his or her office, is a useful way of maintaining that state of affairs.
	What will be the position if someone is challenged by a constable designate? How are they to know whether the designation is still in force, and more importantly, how are they to know whether the powers that the constable designate seeks to exercise have in fact been granted to him? Should constables designate carry round with them a list of the powers that the director general has decided to grant them, together with a list of those that they have not been granted? Of course, they will also need to demonstrate not only that they have the powers, but that they are exercising them for one of the purposes for which they have been authorised. There must be a better way to equip front-line SOCA staff with the powers that they will need.
	I have explained, by way of background, what it means to be a police constable, and described the proposals in the Bill for creating pale imitations to deal with serious and organised crime. Having also painted a picture of the risks inherent in the mix-and-match scheme proposed in clause 41(2), I shall now turn to our amendments. Instead of the second-class constables designate proposed in the Bill, we propose to create a single category of front-line SOCA staff, to be known as police members of SOCA. To become a police member of SOCA, a person must be a constable, and have the powers and duties of a constable.
	So this is, in a sense, an all-or-nothing situation. It is simple. In Committee, the Minister said that that was a disadvantage in our proposals, and that SOCA needed flexibility. To an extent, that is right. That is why we no longer propose that all SOCA police members should have all the rights of police officers, customs officers and immigration officers. However, we do not agree that it is sensible to create half-baked policemen and women, especially for SOCA. That might indeed be flexible, but it would be most unwise.
	First, such a move would lead to a bureaucratic nightmare in which everyone had a different suite of mix-and-match powers, limited as to time and purpose, and constrained as to extent. Secondly, it would lead to a defence lawyers' field day. When the bust took place, they would ask, who exactly exercised which powers? Were the relevant individuals properly authorised? Who exactly seized which evidence? Which specific powers did that person have?
	Thirdly, such a measure would massively overcomplicate the training requirements. It is surely much simpler to say that, if a person is to exercise police powers, they must have had police training. As has been said, that training programme is well established. It is tried and tested, and has proved to provide a coherent approach to the training that is necessary before the powers of a constable can be exercised. Let me make the same point in another way. Our proposal avoids the need for SOCA to reinvent the wheel in terms of police training. We agree that there should be provision for front-line SOCA officers to be able to exercise customs or immigration-officer powers and we propose to enable such powers to be added to the armoury of police members of SOCA.
	The powers of customs and immigration officers are not as extensive as the powers of a police officer, and that is reflected in the training requirements. Immigration officers receive five weeks' training in the case of passport control officers and eight weeks' training in the case of immigration enforcement officers. All entrants then serve a probationary period of one year. Customs officers have a structured, in-house, six-week pre-entry training programme that combines on-the-job training with residential courses. Following a six-week period, they are placed with a mentor for the first month of the job.
	Under our proposals, a police member of SOCA may exercise the powers of an immigration officer or customs officer, but that is subject to a proviso. The proviso is, in either case, that the person has exercised those powers before or has undergone such training as would otherwise entitle him to exercise them. The advantage is, again, that it avoids the need to reinvent the wheel in terms of devising appropriate training.
	Let me say something about our core proposals. Amendment No. 38 aims to provide a new definition of "police members of SOCA". I repeat that it refers to front-line staff. These men and women should be constables. There are other consequential amendments, but the gist is in that one. Under new clause 7, a police member of SOCA will have the powers of a constable. To those powers may be added the powers of a customs officer or immigration officer, provided that the person concerned has been appropriately trained or has exercised the powers before.
	Let me try to put these important proposals in context. The whole purpose of SOCA, as we understand it, is to strengthen the powers available for the prevention and detection of serious organised crime. Essentially, those are policing functions, and the last thing that is required is for the SOCA front line to be staffed by second-rate policemen and policewomen. It seems to us that all front-line SOCA staff who exercise powers of investigation and arrest, and who exercise warrants and so on, ought to have the full range of powers of a police constable and be subject to the same duties. Our new clause and amendments allow those powers to be bolstered by the addition of powers that can be exercised by customs and by immigration powers, but they build in the necessary safeguards involving training or prior experience of exercising those powers.
	Our proposals have the great merit of simplicity. The Government's proposals are too complex, and will lead to confusion. They will require the director general of SOCA to devise a complex bureaucracy for handing out and monitoring mix-and-match powers. They will require him to devise a series of training schemes. They will require him to start from scratch rather than building on available structures and experience. The Government say that that has the merit of flexibility; we think that a fairer description of their proposals is "a recipe for confusion".
	Bold action is needed if SOCA is to have a realistic prospect of achieving its aims. Serious and organised crime calls for investigation and prevention by officers with serious and properly organised powers, and our new clause and amendments achieve that.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this we may take the following:
	Govt new clause 19—Notice of demonstrations in designated area.
	Govt new clause 20—Authorisation of demonstrations in designated area.
	Govt new clause 21—Supplementary directions.
	Govt new clause 22—Offences under sections (Demonstrating without authorisation in designated area) to (Supplementary directions): penalties.
	Govt new clause 23—Loudspeakers in designated area.
	Govt new clause 24—The designated area.
	Govt amendment No. 1
	Amendment No. 2, in page 92, line 27 [Clause 128], at end insert 'or'.
	Amendment No. 3, in page 92, line 28 [Clause 128], leave out from 'Parliament' to end of line 30.
	Amendment No. 134, in page 92, line 30 [Clause 128], at end insert—
	'(d) erecting or displaying material prejudicial to security, or
	(e) causing noise of an offensive or intrusive nature'.
	Amendment No. 4, in page 93, line 4 [Clause 128], after 'officers', insert
	', being of or above the rank of inspector,'.
	Amendment No. 5, in page 93, line 23 [Clause 128], leave out 'one kilometre' and insert '100 metres'
	Amendment No. 135, in page 93, line 23 [Clause 128], leave out 'one kilometre' and insert '200 yards'.
	Government amendment No. 6,
	Government amendment No. 168.

Nicholas Winterton: As the Chairman of the Procedure Committee, I made it clear in the debate we had some time ago that we are not trying to stop people protesting or making their voice heard. Will the Minister ask those who are concerned about what we are trying to do whether they have read the evidence given to our Committee by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, the Clerk of the House, the Serjeant at Arms and Members of Parliament, who expressed grave concern—particularly the Metropolitan Police Commissioner on the ground of security? Had they done so, they would be far more sympathetic to the case she is making, which from this side of the House I warmly support.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. When the measure was originally framed, I shared that view strongly. Speaking for myself, I could accept the idea of a regulatory framework to prevent excesses in Parliament square. I am focusing on my anxieties, which are about the commissioner, the ludicrous, unacceptable time for notification and the designated area, which I mentioned earlier.
	There is no need for a designated area of 1 km around Parliament square. I heartily agree with the comments of the hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) that the distance should be expressed in miles or yards. Frankly, we do not need miles—yards are sufficient. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) tabled an amendment that would provide for an area of 200 yd. That is eminently sensible.
	That brings me to my final point. All the amendments that hon. Members have tabled are redundant because the moment we vote on the clauses, all possibility of further amendment falls. That shows how ludicrous it is to consider those matters on Report. I require concrete assurances. I shall either abstain or vote against the new clauses. I shall abstain if I have a concrete assurance that the deficiencies will be adequately remedied. Otherwise, with regret, I shall have to vote against at least some of the new clauses.

David Heath: In fact, I do not think the Government have a clue what they are doing. They simply have a visceral dislike of someone disagreeing so obviously, and in such a prolonged way, on their doorstep. That is why we have what can only been described, although it is a cliché, as a sledgehammer to crack the proverbial nut. I do not believe that the Government should be making it a criminal offence for someone simply to express his view in Parliament square in a time-honoured way, and I do not think they should extend the area to 1 km. I find it alarming enough that the Minister has changed the Government's position since she said in Committee that the intention was to protect Parliament. Now it is Parliament and Government buildings, which is illustrative in itself.
	I believe that the Government have got this wrong and I urge my colleagues to oppose their measure.

Glenda Jackson: The hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack) spoke of the defacing of Parliament square. I have heard people say that no such demonstrations as we have seen for the past three years should be allowed in Parliament square because it is a world heritage site. It is a world heritage site not because of that rather scruffy square of grass or the statues at its corners, and it is certainly not surrounded by buildings of overwhelming architectural excellence, with the exception possibly of Westminster abbey. It is a centre that the whole world comes to visit because of what has happened in this Parliament, and certainly what happened in Westminster abbey.
	This building is a symbol to the world of a democratic system whereby the rights of the individual were placed above those of, in the first instance, a sovereign, and, in the second instance, a state. Westminster abbey is the great symbol of Christianity with its call to all of us to have compassion for those who are the lowest in our esteem. We should be—
	It being five and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration of the Bill, Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Order [3 February], put forthwith the question already proposed from the Chair.
	Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—
	The House proceeded to a Division.

Question accordingly agreed to.
	Mr. Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.
	Motion made, and Question proposed, that new clauses 19 to 24, 8, 9, 15, 16 and 17 be added to the Bill.
	The House divided: Ayes 263, Noes 88.

New Schedule 1
	 — 
	Remaining minor and consequential amendments
	 — 
	Search warrants
	 — 
	Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934 (c. 56)1      In section 2 of the Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934 (which makes provision about search warrants), in subsection (2), for "one month" substitute "three months".
	 — 
	Public Order Act 1936 (1Edw. 8 & 1 Geo.6 c. 6)2      In section 2 of the Public Order Act 1936 (prohibition of quasi-military organisations), in subsection (5), for "one month" substitute "three months".
	 — 
	Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 (c. 54)3      In section 15 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 (entry and search of premises), in subsection (1), for "one month" substitute "three months".
	 — 
	Licensing Act 1964 (c. 26)4      Until their repeal by the Licensing Act 2003 (c. 17), the following provisions of the Licensing Act 1964 have effect as if for "one month" there were substituted "three months"—

section 54 (search warrants relating to clubs),
	section 85(1) (search warrants relating to parties organised for gain),
	section 187(1) (search warrants relating to sale of alcohol).

Biological Weapons Act 1974 (c. 6)5      In section 4 of the Biological Weapons Act 1974 (powers to search etc.), in subsection (1)(a), for "one month" substitute "three months".
	 — 
	Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (c. 48)6   (1)   The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2)   In section 109 (search warrants), in subsection (3)(b), for "28 days" substitute "three months".
	(3)   In section 200 (search warrants), in subsection (3)(b), for "28 days" substitute "three months".
	(4)   In section 297B (search warrants), in subsection (3)(b), for "28 days" substitute "three months".

Computer Misuse Act 1990 (c. 18)7      In section 14 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (search warrants), in subsection (3)(b), for "twenty-eight days" substitute "three months".
	 — 
	Trade Marks Act 1994 (c. 26)8      In section 92A of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (search warrants), in subsection (3)(b), for "28 days" substitute "three months".'.—[Caroline Flint.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
	Order for Third Reading read.

Charlotte Atkins: I appreciate the concerns of the hon. Lady's constituents, and I am sure that those representations will have been taken up by the operators and will be looked at in the context of the complaints that they have received. However, the Department has so far received very few representations from the hon. Lady's constituents, although obviously she has made representations on their behalf.
	An Oxford to London Paddington service at around 8.15 is calling additionally at Maidenhead to help with overcrowding.
	Regional planning assessments will form the basis for planning the development of the railway over the next five to 20 years. Those will consider the function of the railway within current and future land use and transport systems, and its role in supporting the economic and wider development objectives of local, regional, devolved and central Government. A key objective of the RPAs will be to maximise value for money in pursuit of the Government's objectives for the environment, safety, economy, accessibility and integration. The RPA for the south-west is due to be published in winter 2005.
	The SRA's forthcoming great western main line route utilisation strategy was published for consultation in January and will examine service patterns on all train services using the London Paddington corridor, including consideration of the practicality and value of providing or changing commuter services to Maidenhead and Twyford.
	Maidenhead and Twyford are well used stations with substantial numbers of commuters, making reliable, punctual services absolutely vital. The future of rail services from both towns is secure and the SRA will be working with First Great Western Link to improve the performance and quality of the services to and from them.
	Today, we have had an opportunity to consider the services and for the right hon. Lady to make her points clearly. I am sure that those issues will be noted and taken up by my hon. Friend the Minister of State.
	Question put and agreed to.
	Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes to Twelve o'clock.